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Abstract: Elections are sometimes seen as legitimizing institutions, promoting system-level 
support among citizens by providing them with input into the political process. However, prior 
research has found that is less true among the supporters of losing candidates, who often exhibit 
lower levels of political trust and satisfaction with democracy. We analyze two statewide surveys 
in Florida (following the gubernatorial and senatorial elections of 1998, and the controversial 
presidential election of 2000), and find that (1) losers do exhibit lower levels of political trust, 
satisfaction with democracy, and beliefs that government is responsive to citizens; (2) losers also 
are more likely to endorse "sour grapes" rationalizations of the election outcome, and less likely 
to accept "mandate" interpretations; (3) the meanings that voters ascribe to the election mediate 
the relationship between winning/losing and political trust, but have limited effects on other 
system support variables; and (4) perceptions of procedural fairness moderate the relationships 
between candidate support and system support. These findings suggest that the so-called 
legitimizing function of elections is far from a universal phenomenon. 
 
 
Paper presented for delivery at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL, September 2-5, 2004. Copyright American Political Science 
Association. 
  Elections are at the core of democratic politics. At least in principle if not always in fact, 
they provide citizens with a chance to express their policy views and priorities, to participate 
directly in the political process, and to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions 
(Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Katz 1997); as a result, elections are seen as legitimizing institutions 
that protect the system by generating popular support and by helping to "confine mass political 
action to routine, peaceful channels" (Ginsberg 1982: 7). There is, however, an important catch 
to the argument being made here: According to Ginsberg, "[t]he formal opportunity to participate 
in elections serves to convince citizens that the government is responsive to their needs and 
wishes" (p. 7, emphasis added). 
 
 The catch, of course, is that this probably does not happen as often as one might hope. In 
particular, it seems unlikely that voters who support the losing candidate(s) in an election will be 
as quick as those backing the winner to agree that their voices have been heard – especially if (a) 
as frequently happens, the winner has just spent much of the campaign depicting his or her 
opponent as a liar, a hypocrite, a scoundrel, an incompetent, and/or as someone who is utterly out 
of touch with the needs and wants of constituents; or (b) as happens less often, doubts are raised 
about whether the election itself was conducted in a fair and honest fashion. Prior research 
indicates that winners and losers do not always respond with equal enthusiasm either to the 
election outcome, or to the institutions and processes through which that outcome was rendered 
(Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Clarke and Acock 1989; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Anderson and 
Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Nadeau, Blais, Nevitte, and Gidengil 2000; Anderson and 
LoTempio 2002; but also see Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1997).
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 In this study, we will explore the possibility that these differential responses are shaped in 
part by the interpretations that citizens give to an election. Specifically, do they believe that the 
winning side has earned a mandate from the public to pursue its stated policy objectives? Or, 
alternatively, are they convinced that the margin of victory was attained largely as a result of 
deception (in campaign communications, including paid ads), serendipity (the luck of unforeseen 
and uncontrollable events), the unwarranted influence of powerful special interests, or the 
inability of voters to make an intelligent and rational choice? Further, we want to know whether 
people's interpretations are grounded in beliefs about the fairness of the electoral process itself. It 
is relatively easy, for example, for winners to believe that the competition was fair, that the 
outcome was an accurate reflection of public preferences, and that the institutions headed by 
those who have recently been elected will govern wisely and well and in the best interests of all 
citizens. 
 
 But what about the losers, a number of whom may take campaign attacks against their 
favored candidate personally? (If I vote for someone who has been branded a scoundrel or a 
hypocrite, does that make me a scoundrel or a hypocrite as well?) Are they similarly inclined to 
accept the majority's verdict, and to assume that government officials will be technically 
competent and at the same time attentive – as the rules of democratic politics suggest that they 
should be – to the concerns of people like themselves? Even more dramatically, what happens 
when many on the losing side conclude that the selection process was tainted and that, had the 
votes been counted accurately, their candidate would have emerged victorious? We will attempt 
to answer these questions using data from the 1998 governor's race in Florida, and from a 
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statewide poll (also from Florida) conducted shortly after the contentious presidential election of 
2000 finally came to a close. Our findings reveal that winners and losers frequently do have 
contrasting views about the elections in which they have just competed, and that these views play 
a significant role in shaping citizens' attitudes toward broader political institutions and processes. 
 
Congratulation-Rationalization and Procedural Fairness 
 
 Perhaps it is true that by effectively "co-opting" citizens, elections can "help to increase 
popular support for political leaders and for the regime itself" (Ginsberg 1982: 7). At the level of 
national policy, for example, governments over the years have frequently used the expansion of 
suffrage as a means for inducing people "to rally to the nation's defense and willingly bear the 
cost and sacrifice of war" (p. 16), or to accept an increase in the amount of taxes they must pay 
(p. 18). At the level of individual behavior, it appears that orientations such as trust, efficacy, and 
satisfaction with democracy tend to be at least somewhat more positive among those who vote or 
otherwise participate in the political process (Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Finkel 1985, 1987; 
Nadeau and Blais 1993; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1997; Joslyn 1999; Joslyn and Cigler 2001; 
also see Cigler and Getter 1977).
2
 Yet election campaigns are, in many instances, extremely 
competitive and hard-fought contests that produce winners, losers, and hard feelings on both 
sides. 
 
 One would expect hard feelings to be especially acute among those who end up on the 
short end of the stick; accordingly, insofar as the generation of political support is concerned, it 
is the 
losers' reactions [that] are absolutely crucial. Winners are likely to be 
overwhelmingly satisfied with a process through which the party or candidate they 
voted for gets elected. Losers' support is less obvious. That support requires the 
recognition of the legitimacy of a procedure that has produced an outcome deemed to 
be undesirable (Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553). 
A crucial aspect of legitimacy has to do with losers' acceptance of the election outcome as valid, 
and with their willingness to consent to the winners' rightful authority to implement policies 
advocated during the campaign – policies to which losers may be strongly opposed. In a broader 
sense, the persistence of democratic institutions would seem to depend on the acknowledgement 
by winners and losers alike that "the people" are capable of casting their ballots in a wise and 
thoughtful manner, i.e., that the decisions rendered at the polls are not frivolous, and that the idea 
of democracy itself is not a sham. 
 
 Many years ago, John Kingdon (1966: 23-34) discovered something that he called the 
congratulation-rationalization effect among winning and losing candidates: The former, as it 
happened, were much more likely than the latter to believe that voters were at least reasonably 
well informed, and that they usually made the "right" decision at the polls for the "right" reasons 
(especially in terms of voting for the better candidate rather than the party label). Winners were 
thus inclined to congratulate the electorate – and, indirectly, themselves – for its good judgment, 
while losers rationalized their defeat by assuming that voters had failed to meet their 
responsibilities as democratic citizens. In the present study, we will look for evidence of this 
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phenomenon not among candidates but at the mass level; that is, we will examine in some detail 
the meaning attached to two separate election outcomes by voters themselves. In other words, 
why was Jeb Bush elected governor of Florida in 1998? Was it because people were attracted to 
his conservative policy agenda, his commitment to dealing with the state's most serious 
problems, and his charismatic leadership? Or was it because of the support he received from 
special interests, the fact of his having a famous political name, and the sheer ignorance of voters 
who weren't smart enough to make the correct decision? 
 
 Similarly, what factors contributed to George W. Bush's presidential win in 2000? Did 
voters respond primarily to his conservative politics, his character (especially in contrast to that 
of his predecessor), and his promise to end the partisan conflict that characterized relations 
between Congress and the White House during the Clinton era? Or did Bush benefit more from 
Al Gore's lack of personal charisma, the gullibility of voters who were deceived into supporting 
someone who was more ideologically extreme than he claimed to be, and the failure of state and 
local officials to ensure an honest vote tally on election day? The surveys on which our analysis 
is based were conducted soon after the two elections in question,
3
 so the impressions recorded 
then may have subsequently been modified by exposure to the interpretations offered by the 
media, political activists, and other opinion leaders (e.g., see Hershey 1992; Thomas and Baas 
1996). Nevertheless, if the experience of winning or losing does influence citizens' beliefs about 
democracy and/or their willingness to accede to the wishes of the majority, then we will surely 
find evidence to that effect in the views expressed shortly after those wishes became known. 
 
 It is our belief that if winners are indeed more likely than losers to extend legitimacy to 
the victor (and feel positively toward government and the political process in general), this 
tendency is due in part to systematic differences in how the two groups construe the meaning of 
an election. The two hypotheses that form the core of our argument can be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Citizens who support winning candidates are more likely than those 
who support losers to have a sense of trust in government, to believe that the system 
is responsive to people like themselves, to be satisfied with the democratic process as 
a whole, and to regard the election outcome as a legitimate expression of the public's 
will. 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between winning/losing and political evaluations is 
mediated by citizens' beliefs about whether or not the election outcome represented a 
true mandate, that is, whether the victorious candidate won because most voters 
genuinely preferred his or her policy positions, personal qualities, and/or governing 
style to those of the opponent. Winners will be more inclined to answer in the 
affirmative, losers in the negative, and such beliefs should help to account for 
disparities between the two groups with regard to the orientations outlined above. 
The mere existence of a congratulation-rationalization effect among voters would not, of course, 
constitute a threat to democratic processes. If, however, the propensity for losers to rationalize 
were linked in turn to diminished support for the government, its leaders, or the political system 
in general, that would be (at least potentially
4
) a very different matter. 
 
 As noted earlier, we also want to determine whether supporters of losing candidates are 
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more inclined to view the outcome as a true mandate, and consequently less likely to be critical 
of the winners (and of the institutions winners will lead), when they believe the election has been 
fairly contested. There is considerable evidence indicating that Americans care about decision-
making processes as well as outcomes and, specifically, that they will more readily accept 
"unpalatable binding decisions" made by others if they perceive that those decisions were made 
in an appropriate manner (Hibbing and Alford 2004: 62; also see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2002). What constitutes "appropriate" may vary from one situation to the next, but within the 
electoral context we take it to mean that, for example, there was an open and honest exchange of 
views during the campaign, that all sides had an opportunity to be heard, that debate centered 
more on policy than on personality, and that an accurate vote count was taken on election day 
(cf. Katz 1997). 
 
 What we are proposing, then, is that the attitudes of losers are linked to their perceptions 
of procedural fairness (e.g., see Rasinski and Tyler 1988; Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; 
Weatherford 1992). To be more precise: 
Hypothesis 3: Losers are more likely to interpret the election outcome as conveying a 
true mandate and, hence, more likely to trust government, to believe that the system is 
responsive to people like themselves, to be satisfied with the democratic process as a 
whole, and to extend a sense of legitimacy to the winner when they believe that the 
contest has been fought fairly. Using the same logic, winners should be less likely to 
see the election as a mandate, and should tend to exhibit lower levels of trust, 
efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, and legitimacy if they sense that the rules of 
competition were somehow rigged to favor one side over the other. 
We naturally expect that winners will be more inclined than losers to judge the process in 
favorable terms. Nevertheless, in most elections there should be enough variance in both camps 
to permit a test of our argument. 
 
 In operational terms, we will look at procedural fairness in two very different ways. First, 
estimations of the honesty and negativity of the winning Bush campaign are used to tap beliefs 
about campaign fairness in the 1998 Florida governor's race. Although indirect, our approach is 
based upon the reasonable assumption that voters (especially those who support losers) will be 
unhappy with a process that forces them to listen to their favored candidate be repeatedly 
denounced by his or her opponent over a period of several weeks or months – especially if they 
also believe that the other side's attacks are less than truthful. Accordingly, we will seek to 
determine whether perceptions of Bush fairness in 1998 helped to condition (in line with 
Hypothesis 3) the relationships among winning and losing, congratulation-rationalization, and 
political support.
5
 Second, respondents in the spring of 2001 were asked one question about the 
conduct of elections in general and two questions that tapped beliefs relating to the resolution of 
the Bush-Gore controversy. These items appear to measure perceived procedural fairness in a 
relatively straightforward fashion and, as a result, they provide us with an excellent opportunity 
to test Hypothesis 3 within the context of a presidential race. 
 
Data and Measures 
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 The present study is based on two telephone polls conducted from November 10-22, 1998 
and March 24-April 5, 2001 by the Florida Voter survey organization. Both designs were 
statewide cross-sectional surveys, with respondents being chosen randomly from a list of all 
registered voters; only those whose names were chosen from the list were actually interviewed. 
Up to four call backs were attempted on all working numbers and initial refusals. The margin of 
error in each instance is plus or minus four percentage points.
6
 
 
 The principal dependent variables that we will be examining in our analysis are as 
follows (see the appendix for complete question wordings): 
Political Trust (1998, 2001): (1) how often people who run government can be trusted 
to do the right thing; (2) is government is run by a few big interests or for benefit of 
all the people? 
External Efficacy (1998): (1) do people have final say about how the country is run? 
(2) can public officials be made to listen to what the people think?
7
 
Responsiveness of Government (2001): (1) how much attention government pays to 
what people think; (2) how much elections make government pay attention. 
Satisfaction with Democracy (2001): respondent's satisfaction with how democracy 
works in the United States. 
Bush Legitimacy (2001): whether respondent sees George W. Bush as legitimate 
president of the United States.
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Although political trust is the only variable that is equivalent in both surveys, we see external 
efficacy and responsiveness as tapping essentially the same thing, i.e., beliefs about whether the 
political system allows for ordinary citizens to be heard by, and to exert influence on the actions 
of, governmental decision makers (see Craig et al. 1990: 293). 
 
 The central independent (dummy) variable is operationalized in terms of a respondent's 
support for the winning (Jeb Bush, George W. Bush) or losing (Buddy MacKay, Al Gore) 
candidate in the 1998 Florida governor's and 2000 U. S. presidential elections, respectively, 
regardless of whether that person actually reported having voted on election day.
9
 
Congratulation-rationalization is measured by respondents' assessment of how well several 
statements (see appendix) applied to the two races. Exploratory factor analysis revealed that most 
of the 1998 statements load on one of two dimensions, which we call (1) sour grapes, reflecting 
a belief that the outcome turned on factors other than a genuine preference among voters for the 
winning candidate's policy views, character, and/or leadership skills; and (2) campaign/strategy, 
reflecting a more or less objective assessment of some of the elements that seemed to play a role 
in shaping the Bush-MacKay contest. Thus, people with high scores on the sour grapes 
dimension in 1998 believed that Jeb Bush was elected because of his famous name, disarray 
among the Democrats, help from special interests, and voter ignorance; they tended to reject the 
notion that Bush's victory was attributable either to his conservative philosophy (smaller 
government/lower taxes) or to voters' perceptions that he was better able than his opponent to 
deal with the state's problems. Those who scored high on campaign/strategy felt the outcome 
hinged on Bush's charisma, his reaching out to minorities, his post-1994 movement toward the 
ideological center, and his opponent's unrelenting negativism. Because all four of these accounts 
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reflect a presumed Bush strength or MacKay weakness, we expect supporters of the Republican 
candidate to score at least somewhat higher than those backing the Democrat. 
 
 Factor analysis of the 2001 data also yielded two dimensions, except this time the 
distinction between them is more easily interpretable than was the case in 1998. Once again, we 
have (1) sour grapes, which reflects the belief that voters were either misled or manipulated into 
making a poor decision; and (2) true mandate, which involves an acceptance that the electorate's 
choice conveyed a genuine preference for the winner in one or more key areas. Individuals who 
scored high on sour grapes indicated that George W. Bush won because of his backing from 
special interests, voters' lack of intelligence, their failure to reward properly the Democrats for its 
strong economic performance during the Clinton years, and Bush's ability to fool people into 
thinking he was less right-wing than he actually was. In contrast, high scores on the true mandate 
dimension reflected a belief that voters chose Bush because of his conservative views, his 
commitment to improving the working relationship between White House and Capitol Hill, his 
ability to handle the nation's important problems, and the expectation that he would be honest 
and not embarrass the office of the presidency as had his predecessor. 
 
 As noted earlier, we tried to capture the notion of procedural fairness in a couple of ways. 
First, in 1998, we reasoned that people (especially losers) would not conclude that the process 
was unfair simply because the other side went negative during the campaign; however, if they 
were believed to have been less than honest (relying on distortion and innuendo, if not outright 
lies) in doing so, that might be a different story. Following this logic, we included dummy 
variables reflecting respondents' beliefs about whether Bush's ads were untruthful, beliefs about 
whether the tone of the Bush campaign was negative, and an interaction between the two. Our 
measure of procedural (un)fairness in 2001 is more direct: a three-item unfair elections index 
based upon beliefs about the fairness of campaigns generally, whether  Bush won only because 
the votes in Florida were not counted properly (a question that was originally included in our 
congratulation-rationalization battery, but did not load clearly on either factor), and whether the 
Supreme Court decision in Bush vs. Gore was based on political considerations.
10
 Although 
these two indicators are not strictly comparable, we believe that each reflects an aspect of the 
process concerns that are so important in shaping citizens' opinions about government and 
politics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
11
 
 
Results 
 
 Our first hypothesis states that citizens who favor winners are more likely than those who 
prefer losers to express positive orientations toward the government, its leaders, and the political 
system in general. Results from the left-hand portion of table 1 are mixed: Supporters of 1998 
gubernatorial winner Jeb Bush were indeed less trustful of government than respondents who 
backed loser Buddy MacKay, though there are no significant differences between the two groups 
in terms of their feelings of external efficacy. The pattern for 2000, however, is entirely in line 
with our predications: Those who preferred George W. Bush for president were significantly 
more trustful, more likely to believe that the system is responsive, more satisfied with the way 
democracy works in the United States, and more likely to accept Bush as legitimate even in light 
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of the ongoing controversy over the Florida vote count. Under the circumstances (including the 
2000 figures for governmental responsiveness), we are inclined to believe that the null results for 
efficacy in 1998 are less an exception to the general rule than a reflection of measurement 
unreliability (see note 8). Overall, hypothesis 1 is handsomely confirmed. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 We should point out, by the way, that Bush-MacKay was not the only major statewide 
election on Florida's ballot in 1998. In addition to various Cabinet offices that were up for grabs, 
there was a relatively high-visibility U. S. Senate contest between Democratic incumbent Bob 
Graham and Republican challenger Charlie Crist – and in this instance, the Democrat won by 
roughly the same margin as did Bush in the governor's race. Although one might imagine that 
half a loaf would be better than none, and that the negative effects of backing MacKay would be 
ameliorated by being a Senate winner, the reality is that Bush-MacKay was clearly the glamour 
matchup of 1998 in terms of media coverage (both national and statewide); it also was a contest 
that each side felt it had a chance to win, and one that each wanted badly. At the same time, it 
may be that gubernatorial (executive) elections are typically viewed by voters as more important 
than legislative contests, even when the latter involves one of a mere hundred Senate seats in 
Washington. Whatever the explanation, our data (not shown here, but see table 2 below) reveal 
that it was Senate losers, i.e., those who backed Crist (and, most of the time, Jeb Bush as well), 
who came away from the election with a more positive attitude toward government.
12
 
 
 Our second hypothesis asserts that winners and losers tend to offer different explanations 
for why the victorious candidate won, and that these explanations mediate the relationship 
between election outcome and political evaluations. The first part of the argument is confirmed 
by results presented in the bottom portion of table 1. In 1998, MacKay supporters scored, on 
average (1) substantially higher on the sour grapes index, that is, they were more likely to believe 
that Bush won because of his famous name, discord among the Democrats, help from the special 
interests, and voters' failure to understand the issues, and less likely to accept that Bush was 
preferred because of his conservative views and perceived competence; and (2) slightly (but 
significantly) lower on the campaign/strategy index, that is, they were less likely to attribute the 
election outcome to Bush's personal (charisma) and strategic (reaching out to minorities, running 
toward the center, finding the right balance of positive and negative messages) effectiveness as a 
campaigner. Similarly, Gore supporters in 2000 scored (1) much higher on sour grapes, that is, 
they felt the presidential election turned on such factors as the influence of special interests and 
the shortcomings of ordinary voters (not giving Democrats enough credit for a strong economy, 
letting themselves be misled about Bush's ideological leanings, and their inability to understand 
the issues); and (2) considerably lower on the true mandate index, that is, they were less likely to 
believe that Bush won because of his conservative policies, perceived competence, honesty, and 
pledge to work more effectively with Congress. All of these differences are as expected. 
 
 In order to verify that the patterns here are not simply a product of partisanship, we 
estimated multivariate logit models with controls for party identification, interest in politics, and 
beliefs about campaign fairness.
13
 As shown in table 2, support for the gubernatorial winner (and 
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for the same-party senatorial loser) remains strongly and negatively associated with a sour grapes 
interpretation of the election outcome in 1998, even with the effects of these other variables 
taken into account. However, while Bush (but not Graham) supporters also tend to score higher 
on the campaign/strategy index, the coefficient is only marginally significant (p = 0.06). Results 
are more clear-cut in 2000, with supporters of George W. Bush being much more likely both to 
reject a sour grapes explanation of the election, and to endorse the idea that Bush's victory 
represented a true mandate from voters. It is noteworthy that winning/losing has an impact on 
congratulation/rationalization even with party identification (significant on its own in 2000 but 
not in 1998) held constant. We also are struck by the role played by our procedural fairness 
variables. In 1998, beliefs about the relative negativity of Jeb Bush's campaign ads are associated 
with both congratulation/rationalization indices; further, the Bush unfairness interaction term 
(untruthful * negativity) exerts an independent effect in the first equation, i.e., respondents who 
felt that Bush's ads were both untruthful and negative tended to reject a sour grapes explanation. 
In 2000, those who scored high on the unfair elections index were more likely to endorse sour 
grapes and less likely to believe that the outcome represented a genuine mandate for the new 
president. We will return to the matter of procedural fairness momentarily. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 Hypothesis 2 suggests not only that supporters of winning and losing candidates tend to 
view the outcome in different ways, but that interpretations of what the election "means" serve to 
mediate the relationship between candidate preference and political evaluations such as trust, 
external efficacy, governmental responsiveness, satisfaction with democracy, and legitimacy (see 
table 1). The evidence for this argument is mixed, especially in 1998 where the relationship to be 
mediated is quite weak (or nonexistent) to start with. We saw earlier that Jeb Bush supporters 
were more trustful, but no more externally efficacious, than those who backed Buddy MacKay 
for governor. The initial multivariate results (model 1) shown in table 3 confirm that winning/ 
losing has no discernible effect on external efficacy and only a modest impact (p = .07 for the 
gubernatorial variable) on trust. Consistent with our second hypothesis, the latter relationship 
disappears altogether when congratulation/rationalization factors are added to the equation 
(model 2); specifically, people who offered a sour grapes interpretation of the Bush-MacKay 
race were, regardless of which candidate they supported in the election (or their party affiliation 
for that matter), significantly less trustful than those who rejected such an explanation. The 
campaign/strategy variable is unrelated to either trust or efficacy. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 Results for 2000 are closer to what we anticipated, at least for political trust. While the 
first model presented in table 4 shows higher trust among Bush supporters (and Republicans), 
that relationship disappears in model 2, where the impact of trust appears to be entirely mediated 
by congratulation/rationalization factors; in other words, individuals who expressed a sour grapes 
interpretation of Bush's victory were significantly less trusting of government, and those who felt 
that voters had given the new president a true mandate were significantly more so. Turning to the 
Bush legitimacy variable, coefficients for winning/losing and party identification are once again 
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in the expected direction (Bush supporters and Republicans being more likely to view the new 
president as legitimate); these coefficients are strong and significant, however, not only in model 
1 but also (contrary to our second hypothesis) in model 2, when congratulation/rationalization 
indices are added to the equation. In this case, sour grapes drops by the wayside and beliefs 
about Bush's mandate emerges as the dominant lens through which citizens ascribe meaning to 
the election outcome.
14
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 Neither responsiveness nor satisfaction with democracy follows the expected pattern. The 
former, which is conceptually very close to external efficacy (Craig et al. 1990) is associated 
with party identification (Republicans believing government to be more responsive) but not with 
winning/losing either before or after the introduction of congratulation/rationalization factors. 
The latter, which on its face appears to be tapping a broader orientation toward the regime rather 
than attitudes about specific governmental leaders and institutions (but see Canache, Mondak, 
and Seligson 2001), turns out to be, ceteris paribus, unrelated to either winning/losing or partisan 
affiliation. As we saw with trust and Bush legitimacy, explanations for the election outcome 
matter more: Both sour grapes and true mandate are significant in the model 2 equation for 
responsiveness, while true mandate is significant in the model 2 equation for satisfaction with 
democracy. 
 
 What, then, about procedural fairness? Adding the Bush unfairness measures, either 
singly or interactively, to the 1998 equations (see model 3 in table 3) does not change our results 
in any meaningful way: Sour grapes remains the only variable that is significantly associated 
with either political trust or external efficacy. As before, the patterns in 2000 are more complex 
(see model 3 in table 4): (1) The relationships between both winning/losing and party 
identification on the one hand, and political trust on the other, appear to be moderated by beliefs 
about the fairness of elections in general, and about the fairness of the 2000 election in particular, 
as well as by beliefs about whether George W. Bush was given a mandate by voters in that 
election. The coefficient for sour grapes is no longer significant. (2) The unfair elections index 
has a strong impact on Bush legitimacy, but one that is in addition to the effects registered by 
winning/losing, partisanship, and beliefs about a true mandate; no mediating effect is evident 
here. (3) Procedural (un)fairness is negatively associated with governmental responsiveness and 
satisfaction with democracy. What is curious in each of these cases is that with beliefs about 
unfair elections taken into account, the coefficient for winning/losing becomes significant or 
nearly so (p = .05 and .06, respectively) – and negative, that is, losers (Gore supporters) more 
than winners are the ones who feel that government pays attention to its citizens and who feel 
that democracy is working well in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Elections are often characterized as legitimating institutions, especially for citizens who 
supported the losing candidate and whose willingness to accept the final verdict is supposedly 
enhanced by the sense that their views have been given a fair and proper hearing during the 
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course of the campaign. Consistent with prior research, however, our analysis of survey data 
from the 1998 gubernatorial and 2000 presidential elections in Florida uncovered some fairly 
substantial differences between winners and losers. Specifically, the latter tend to be less trustful, 
less certain of the responsiveness of government to popular concerns, less satisfied with the way 
democracy is working in the United States, and less inclined to extend legitimacy to the winner; 
they also are less likely to believe that the election outcome represented a genuine mandate from 
voters, and less generous in their assessments of the fairness of the selection process itself. 
 
 Not all of these relationships are strong, and some become weaker or disappear altogether 
when partisan loyalties are taken into account. Yet neither partisanship, candidate preference, nor 
the two taken together tell the entire story. First, our results suggest that some elections are more 
important than others (president more than governor, governor more than senator) in terms of 
their potential to generate negative sentiments toward governmental leaders and institutions 
among supporters of the losing candidate. Second, not all evaluative orientations are significantly 
affected by the outcome of an election (trust and legitimacy appear to be more susceptible than 
the others considered here, though future research may indicate differently). Third, to the extent 
that there is a relationship between winning/losing and political evaluations, it is sometimes 
mediated (consistent with our second and third hypotheses) by beliefs about (1) the meaning of 
the election, or what we refer to as congratulation/rationalization factors; and (2) the fundamental 
fairness of the process by which the decision was reached. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
congratulation/rationalization and procedural fairness assessments (especially the latter) clearly 
have impacts of their own, independent of winning/losing and partisanship, on the way citizens 
feel about government and the political process in general. Overall, our findings confirm that the 
so-called legitimizing function of elections is far from a universal phenomenon. 
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Notes 
 
 1. The analysis by Anderson and Guillory suggests that this relationship will vary across 
contexts, for example, depending upon the degree to which a political system is majoritarian or 
consensual (Lijphart 1984; also see Norris 1999). 
 2. A markedly different perspective is offered by Brehm and Rahn (1997; also see Clarke 
and Acock 1989; Freie 1997). 
 3. The 1998 survey was done immediately following the election, while in 2000 there was a 
lag of roughly 3-4 months. If anything, longer interval between the 2000 election and the survey 
probably makes it less likely that we will find  empirical support for our hypothesized differences 
between winners and losers (see below). 
 4. The behavioral and systemic consequences of popular discontent are uncertain, though 
there is evidence to suggest that political trust, efficacy, and support are associated with such things 
as policy preferences (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Hetherington and Globetti 2002), voting 
for third-party candidates (Hetherington 1999), support for government-limiting ballot measures 
(including tax restrictions and term limits; Sears and Citrin 1985; Karp 1995), and compliance with 
the law (Scholz and Lubell 1998). 
 5. In the interest of parsimony, we will not examine perceptions of MacKay fairness. Our 
assumption is that such perceptions were not terribly relevant either for voters who supported 
MacKay (since any disaffection they felt should depend mainly on whether they believed that the 
other side had played fair) or for those who supported Bush (since winning the election should 
override other considerations). 
 6. The 2001 data have been weighted to correct for a slight imbalance in the distribution 
of party registrants. Additional information about these polls can be obtained from Florida Voter 
directly (954-584-0204), or from the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning in the Political 
Science Department at the University of Florida (352-392-0262). 
 7. These questions represent the regime-based dimension of external efficacy. See Craig, 
Niemi, and Silver (1990). 
 8. Each of these concepts were measured on a scale that was recoded to range from 0 to 
1, with the latter signifying more positive feelings. For trust, efficacy, and responsiveness, 
responses were given the mean score based on their answers to the two questions comprising the 
index. Reliability estimates (Cronbach's α) are as follows: trust 1998 = .670, trust 2001 = .596, 
efficacy = .250 (r = .14 between the two component items, which probably reflects the severe 
response set biases that typically plague agree-disagree questions; see Craig, Niemi, and Silver 
1990), and responsiveness = .654. 
 9. Almost everyone did (87 percent in 1998, 95 percent in 2000), which is not surprising 
considering that our sampling frame was registered voters. Nevertheless, when we replicated our 
using self-reported voters only, the findings reported below were not altered in any meaningful 
way. In both elections, those who supported the winner received a score of 1, others a score of 0. 
 10. As with our dependent variables (see note 8), both congratulation-rationalization and 
procedural fairness were measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 1; higher values indicate (a) a 
belief that the factors in question contributed to the election of Jeb Bush in 1998 and George W. 
Bush in 2000; and (b) greater perceived fairness. Reliability estimates (Cronbach's α) are as 
follows: sour grapes 1998 = .725, sour grapes 2001 = .694, campaign/strategy 1998 = .515, true 
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mandate 2001 = .784, and procedural fairness 2001 = .757. In order to preserve cases for 
analysis, we calculated scores based on the mean of at least three non-missing component 
variables for each of the rationalization-congratulation indices in 1998 and 2001, and the mean 
of at least two non-missing component variables for the procedural fairness index in 2001. 
 11. Not surprisingly, Gore supporters in 2001 scored substantially higher on the unfair 
elections index than did Bush supporters (a mean of 0.62 to 0.11, t = 26.69, p < .001). In 1998, 
those who favored MacKay were much more likely than those backing Bush to believe that the 
Republican candidate's campaign was negative (54 to 17 percent, t = 9.56, p < .001), untruthful 
(44 to 7 percent, t = 10.66, p < .001), or both (31 to 3 percent, t = 8.92, p < .001). 
 12. As with Bush-MacKay, this was true for political trust but not external efficacy. The 
possibility that some elections are more important than others in shaping people's attitudes also is 
examined by Anderson and LoTempio (2002). 
 13. Party identification was measured as the standard seven-point scale ranging from 
strong Republican to strong Democrat. Interest was measured by asking respondents whether 
they follow "what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the 
time, only now and then, or hardly at all." In our preliminary analyses, we also controlled for 
several demographic variables, including age, gender, and education, as well as political interest 
(see Anderson and LoTempio 2002). Only the latter showed any effects in our most basic models 
and so, for the sake of parsimony, we removed the others from further consideration. 
 14. Reasoning that the effects of procedural fairness might be different for Bush and Gore 
supporters, we also ran these analyses with a (candidate preference * unfair elections) interaction 
term; its effect on the dependent variables in Table 4 was negligible. A three-way interaction 
(candidate support * Bush untruthful * Bush negativity) had no effect on trust in 1998 but, for 
reasons that we are at a loss to explain, did have a statistically significant impact on external 
efficacy. 
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Appendix 
 
Question wordings for the variables employed in our analysis are provided below. Higher scores 
reflect more positive feelings on political trust, external efficacy, responsiveness, satisfaction 
with democracy, Bush legitimacy, and procedural fairness (Bush fairness in 1998, fair elections 
in 2001). See text and note 10 for interpretation of congratulation/rationalization measures. 
 
Political Trust (1998, 2001). (1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the people 
who run our government to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, only some of 
the time or almost never? (2) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big 
interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (Note: The 
"almost never" option was a volunteered response in 1998.) 
 
External Efficacy (1998). Strongly agree to strongly disagree (5-point scale) with the following 
statements: (1) Under our form of government the people have the final say about how the 
country is run, no matter who is in office. (2) If public officials are not interested in hearing what 
the people think, there is really no way to make them listen. 
 
Responsiveness of Government (2001). (1) Over the years, how much attention do you feel the 
government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do – a good deal, some, or not 
much? (2) And how much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention 
to what the people think – a good deal, some, or not much? 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy (2001). On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in the United States – satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied? 
 
Bush Legitimacy (2001). People have different views about whether or not George W. Bush is 
the legitimate president of the United States. Do you accept him as entirely legitimate, accept 
him as somewhat legitimate, or do you not accept him as legitimate at all? 
 
Congratulation/Rationalization (1998). In talking about the governor's race, people have 
expressed different opinions about why it turned out the way it did. What I’d like to do next is 
read you a series of statements, and have you tell me how much you think each one applies to the 
Bush-MacKay campaign for governor. The first statement is. . . . Do you think this statement 
describes what happened in the governor's race extremely well, fairly well, only slightly, or not 
at all? (a) Voters preferred the candidate with the most personal charisma – that is, Jeb Bush won 
because he was a fresh face with new ideas. (b) Voters chose Jeb Bush because of his 
commitment to smaller government and lower taxes. (c) Buddy MacKay's problem was that his 
party never got its act together – a better-organized campaign by the Democrats would have 
made a big difference. (d) Jeb Bush's victory had a lot to do with his willingness to reach out to 
certain groups – for example, African-Americans and other minorities – that Democrats usually 
take for granted. (e) Jeb Bush would never have won except for the fact that he is the son of a 
former president. (f) Voters rejected Buddy MacKay because his campaign was too negative – 
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all he ever did was attack Jeb Bush without ever giving people a positive program of his own to 
support. (g) Jeb Bush did better in 1998 than when he ran for governor four years ago [and lost to 
incumbent Democrat Lawton Chiles] because his campaign this time was less right-wing and 
more middle-of-the-road. (h) Jeb Bush won because the powerful special interests in Florida 
wanted him to win. (i) Voters preferred Jeb Bush because they felt he would do a better job of 
dealing with Florida’s most important problems, such as education and crime. (j) Buddy MacKay 
lost because too many voters just don’t understand the issues well enough to make an intelligent 
choice. 
 
Congratulation-Rationalization (2001). People have expressed different opinions about why last 
year's election turned out the way it did. What I'd like to do next is read you a series of 
statements, and have you tell me how much you think each one applies to the Bush-Gore 
campaign for president. The first statement is. . . . Do you think this statement describes what 
happened in the president's race extremely well, fairly well, only slightly, or not at all? (a) Voters 
chose George Bush because of his commitment to smaller government and lower taxes. (b) 
Voters preferred George Bush because they were tired of all the partisan bickering that took place 
between Congress and the White House during the Clinton years. (c) George Bush won because the 
powerful special interests in this country wanted him to win. (d) Voters preferred George Bush 
because they felt he would do a better job of dealing with the nation's most important problems, 
such as education, crime, and national defense. (e) Al Gore lost because too many voters just don't 
understand the issues well enough to make an intelligent choice. (f) Al Gore's problem was that he 
wasn't able to persuade voters to give Democrats the credit they deserved for getting the nation's 
economy back on its feet in the 1990s. (g) George Bush won because, after eight years of Bill 
Clinton, voters wanted someone who would be honest and who could be trusted not to embarrass 
the office of the presidency. (h) George Bush won because he fooled people into believing that he 
was a different kind of conservative – one who was less right-wing and more middle-of-the-road 
than he really is. 
 
Bush Unfairness (1998). (1) Over the past few months, do you recall seeing or hearing any Jeb 
Bush for governor campaign ads on TV or radio? [If yes] Did you think the Bush campaign ads 
were truthful or not very truthful? (2) As you know, some campaigns are mostly positive – that 
is, candidates talking about their own record and qualifications – but others are mostly negative – 
that is, candidates criticizing something about their opponent. Overall, would you say the Bush 
campaign for governor this year was very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or 
very negative? (Scores on the latter question were recoded so that 0 = positive and 1 = negative.) 
 
Unfair Elections (2001). (1) In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted 
fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Overall, do 
you believe that elections in the United States are very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or 
very unfair? (2) George Bush really didn't win the election at all – the only reason he is president 
today is because the votes in Florida weren't counted properly. [The preceding question was part 
of the 2001 congratulation-rationalization battery described above: How well does this statement 
describe what happened in the 2000 presidential election?] (3) As you know, last December, a 
majority of justices on the U. S. Supreme Court decided that the state of Florida could not have a 
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hand recount of the votes in the presidential election. As a result, Al Gore conceded the election and 
George W. Bush became president. Do you think that the justices on the Supreme Court who voted 
to end the recount in Florida did so based mostly on the legal merits of the case, or based mostly on 
their own desire to have Bush as the next president? 
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Table 1 
 
Candidate Choice and Political Evaluations in Florida, 1998 and 2000 
 
 
          1998 Gubernatorial                 2000 Presidential 
    MacKay      Bush      Gore        Bush 
       Mean         Mean         t          sig (t)    Mean       Mean         t          sig (t) 
 
Political Trust       0.34            0.41        -3.18         0.00     0.28          0.49         9.25         0.00 
External Efficacy      0.49            0.52        -1.11         0.27      n/a            n/a           n/a            n/a 
Governmental Responsiveness     n/a               n/a           n/a           n/a     0.49          0.64         5.47         0.00 
Satisfaction with Democracy      n/a               n/a           n/a           n/a     0.68          0.77         3.82         0.00 
Bush Legitimacy       n/a               n/a           n/a           n/a     0.49          0.97        19.66        0.00 
 
Sour Grapes Index      0.61            0.27        21.28         0.00     0.63          0.27       -18.37        0.00 
Campaign/Strategy Index     0.53            0.61        -3.86          0.00     n/a            n/a            n/a           n/a 
True Mandate Index        n/a              n/a           n/a            n/a     0.35          0.76         23.36        0.00 
 
 
Note: Data are from post-election 1998 and 2001 Florida Voter surveys of registered voters (the latter weighted for party registration). 
Results are presented for actual voters as well as for nonvoters who supported one of the major-party candidates for 
governor/president (see note 9). 
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Table 2 
Explaining Rationalization/Congratulation, 1998 and 2000 
 
 
     1998 Gubernatorial     2000 Presidential 
Sour Grapes Index   Coefficient        S.E.   Coefficient        S.E. 
Winner/Loser (Governor)      -2.20**   0.24         n/a     n/a 
Winner/Loser (Senate)        1.10**   0.21         n/a     n/a 
Winner/Loser (President)        n/a     n/a       -1.41**   0.28 
Party Identification        0.07    0.05       -0.10*   0.05 
Interest in Politics       -0.58†   0.32       -0.18   0.26 
Bush Untruthful        0.39    0.31         n/a     n/a 
Bush Negativity        0.45*   0.22         n/a     n/a 
Bush Unfairness        0.80*   0.40         n/a     n/a 
   (Untruthful * Negativity) 
Unfair Elections         n/a     n/a        1.93**   0.37 
-2 log likelihood =    1869.19    1623.54 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =      0.53        0.41 
Number of cases =       508        526 
 
Campaign/Strategy Index (1998) 
True Mandate Index (2000) 
Winner/Loser (Governor)       0.41†   0.22         n/a     n/a 
Winner/Loser (Senate)        0.12    0.21         n/a     n/a 
Winner/Loser (President)        n/a     n/a        1.69**   0.28 
Party Identification        0.04    0.05        0.16**   0.05 
Interest in Politics       -0.17   0.33        0.37    0.26 
Bush Untruthful       -0.08   0.31         n/a     n/a 
Bush Negativity       -0.58**   0.23         n/a     n/a 
Bush Unfairness       -0.44   0.40         n/a     n/a 
   (Untruthful * Negativity) 
Unfair Elections         n/a     n/a      -2.53**   0.38 
-2 log likelihood =    1607.37    1465.43 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =      0.07        0.53 
Number of cases =       494        531 
** p ≤ .01 * p ≤ .05 † p ≤ .10 
 
 
Note: Data are from post-election 1998 and 2001 Florida Voter surveys of registered voters (the 
latter weighted for party registration). Table entries are ordered logit coefficients and associated 
standard errors (listwise deletion for missing data; threshold levels not shown). High scores 
indicate a vote for the winning candidate (Bush, Graham in 1998; Bush in 2000), Republican 
identification, greater interest, perceived untruthfulness/negativity/unfairness, and a belief that 
the election outcome was shaped by factors defining a given congratulation/rationalization index. 
Table 3 
 
A Multivariate Model of Political Evaluations in Florida, 1998 
 
 
      Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
        Coefficient        S.E.     Coefficient        S.E.     Coefficient        S.E. 
Political Trust 
Winner/Loser (Governor)           0.39†     0.21            -0.25     0.25            -0.29     0.25 
Winner/Loser (Senate)          -0.13     0.21             0.12     0.22             0.13     0.22 
Party Identification           -0.02     0.05             0.00     0.05             0.01     0.05 
Interest in Politics           -0.11     0.32            -0.23     0.35            -0.26     0.35 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -2.25**     0.48            -2.19**     0.49 
Campaign/Strategy Index            n/a      n/a            -0.02     0.37            -0.03     0.38 
Bush Untruthful             n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -0.46     0.33 
Bush Negativity             n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -0.02     0.24 
Bush Unfairness (Untruthful * Negativity)    n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a             0.35     0.43 
-2 log likelihood =          787.67         1728.87         1740.82 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.02            0.07            0.07 
Number of cases =            511            494            494 
 
External Efficacy 
Winner/Loser (Governor)           0.22     0.20            -0.18     0.24            -0.17     0.24 
Winner/Loser (Senate)           0.20     0.21             0.34     0.22             0.35     0.22 
Party Identification           -0.01     0.05             0.01     0.05             0.01     0.05 
Interest in Politics           -0.06     0.31            -0.05     0.33            -0.05     0.33 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -1.45**     0.45            -1.44**     0.47 
Campaign/Strategy Index            n/a      n/a            -0.02     0.36            -0.03     0.37 
Bush Untruthful             n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a             0.04     0.31 
Bush Negativity             n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -0.18     0.23 
Bush Unfairness (Untruthful * Negativity)    n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a             0.16     0.41 
 
continued
Table 3, continued (p. 2) 
 
 
-2 log likelihood =          862.06         2017.91         2031.96 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.00            0.02            0.03 
Number of cases =            510            494            494 
 
** p ≤ .01 * p ≤ .05 † p ≤ .10 
 
 
Note: Data are from the post-election 1998 Florida Voter survey of registered voters (the latter weighted for party registration). Table 
entries are ordered logit coefficients and associated standard errors (listwise deletion for missing data; threshold levels not shown). 
High scores indicate a vote for the winning candidate (Bush, Graham), Republican identification, greater interest, perceived 
unfairness, and a belief that the election outcome was shaped by factors defining a given congratulation/rationalization index. 
Table 4 
 
A Multivariate Model of Political Evaluations in Florida, 2000 
 
 
      Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
        Coefficient        S.E.     Coefficient        S.E.     Coefficient        S.E. 
Political Trust 
Winner/Loser (President)           0.70**     0.24            -0.09     0.29            -0.57†     0.31 
Party Identification            0.18**     0.05             0.12*     0.05             0.06     0.05 
Interest in Politics            0.36     0.27             0.19     0.47             0.23     0.28 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -1.02**     0.35            -0.48     0.37 
True Mandate Index             n/a      n/a             1.92**     0.41             1.03*     0.43 
Unfair Elections Index            n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -2.64**     0.44 
-2 log likelihood =          562.51         1691.08         1727.56 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.15            0.22            0.27 
Number of cases =            538            524            521 
 
Governmental Responsiveness 
Winner/Loser (Governor)           0.29     0.23            -0.25     0.28            -0.60*     0.30 
Party Identification            0.17**     0.05             0.15**     0.05             0.11*     0.05 
Interest in Politics            0.46†     0.26             0.36     0.27             0.40     0.27 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -0.93**     0.35            -0.48     0.36 
True Mandate Index             n/a      n/a             0.81*     0.39             0.11     0.42 
Unfair Elections             n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -1.92**     0.43 
-2 log likelihood =          383.98         1370.87         1433.35 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.09            0.12            0.15 
Number of cases =            539            525            522 
 
continued
Table 4, continued (p. 2) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Winner/Loser (President)           0.30     0.25            -0.16     0.30            -0.61†     0.32 
Party Identification            0.08     0.05             0.04     0.05            -0.01     0.06 
Interest in Politics            0.49†     0.28             0.47†     0.28             0.46     0.29 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -0.33     0.37             0.20     0.38 
True Mandate Index             n/a      n/a             1.37**     0.42             0.65     0.44 
Unfair Elections Index            n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -2.16**     0.45 
-2 log likelihood =          270.15         1004.03         1052.52 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.04            0.06            0.11 
Number of cases =            534            520            517 
 
Bush Legitimacy 
Winner/Loser (President)           2.69**     0.35             1.92**     0.41             1.45**     0.43 
Party Identification            0.41**     0.07             0.34**     0.08             0.29**     0.08 
Interest in Politics            0.69†     0.36             0.81*     0.38             0.72†     0.40 
Sour Grapes Index             n/a      n/a            -0.28     0.50             0.58     0.54 
True Mandate Index             n/a      n/a             3.38**     0.54             2.33**     0.58 
Unfair Elections Index            n/a      n/a              n/a      n/a            -3.08**     0.54 
-2 log likelihood =          140.76          529.22          520.89 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 =           0.54            0.60            0.64 
Number of cases =            535            522            519 
 
** p ≤ .01 * p ≤ .05 † p ≤ .10 
 
 
Note: Data are from the post-election 2001 Florida Voter survey of registered voters (the latter weighted for party registration). Table 
entries are ordered logit coefficients and associated standard errors (listwise deletion for missing data; threshold levels not shown). 
High scores indicate a vote for the winning candidate (Bush), Republican identification, greater interest, perceived unfairness, and a 
belief that the election outcome was shaped by factors defining a given congratulation/rationalization index. 
